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Many of the old cases are strange and absurd : so also are some of the modern ones.
— Legal cases
Many of the old cases are strange and absurd : so also are some of the modern ones.
Some modern cases have in my opinion gone too far.
In our law every case hath its stand or fall from a particular reason or circumstance.
Every case stands upon its own bottom.
I have the strongest disinclination, as I believe every other Judge has, that any case should be decided otherwise than upon its merits.
The Court has not time to indulge in the discussion of imaginary cases.
We are obliged to follow settled established rules already fixed by former determinations in cases of the same kind.
We must not overturn, the cases.
The use of cases is to establish principles; if the cases decide different from the principles, I must follow the principles, not the decisions.
Pray let us so resolve cases here that they may stand with the reason of mankind, when they are debated abroad. Shall that be reason here that is not reason in any part of the world besides?
The reason and spirit of cases make law; not the letter of particular precedents.
The case in Levinz was about an hundred years ago: Put a marginal note, and it will serve an hundred years hence.
Never trust any note cited, when not consonant with the general principles of law, justice, and equity. It must be wrong.
A case may not be the less doubtful because I entertain no doubt on the subject; but that is doubtful concerning which learned men differ.
This is an English case, which it is my duty to decide according to the principles of English law.
I can only regret that I am obliged to give a decision which conflicts with the justice of the case, and wrongs those to whom I would rather that justice should be done.
I confess that when I am sought to be driven to a conclusion which appears to me unreasonable and unjust, I at once suspect the validity of the premises, even if I can detect no flaw in the reasoning from them.
Without an express authority, so strong as not to be gotten over, we ought not to determine a case so much against reason, as that the Parliament should be obliged to interfere to set it right.
For several reasons we should not depart from these adjudged cases ; but chiefly, from the inconvenience of altering and overturnirig settled determinations. It is best, stare decisis. The overturning settled determinations would be of very bad consequence: they ought not to be shaken.
Whatever might have been my opinion, had this been a new case, I must hold myself bound by decided cases.
